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Informed Consent and the Dying Patient
People afflicted with terminal illness1 rarely die at home. The suc-
cess of medicine has shifted the locus of dying to public and private
health care institutions, 2 thus transferring control over treatment
away from the patient and his family to the health care provider and
the state. This has been a tacit accommodation to the way health
sciences treat the dying, rather than an explicit legal choice.
The terminally ill patient may nevertheless wish to forego treatment
offered by the health care institution for a number of reasons: reli-
gious beliefs, pain and suffering, exhaustion of financial resources,3
acquiescence to death on the loss of control over most bodily func-
tions. The patient's wish may conflict with the interests of the health
care providers who are committed to prolongation of life through
medical technology,4 or with what seem to be the interests of the
state, asserted through laws against suicide and homicide. The applica-
tion of these laws is fraught with difficulty in cases of "passive eu-
thanasia," 5 the withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment; none-
I. Since death is inevitable, life itself could be characterized as a terminal illness.
This Note necessarily uses "terminal illness" in a more limited sense, to refer to im-
minent death. Medical science has failed to elucidate the concept beyond this general
understanding, and the problems of lucid intervals and remissions in the patient com-
plicate any general definition. Cf. I W. ANDERSON, PATHOLOGY 551-52 (6th ed. 1971).
2. See E. KUBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING 5-7 (1969); Cassell, Dying in a Tech-
nological Society, HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES, May 1974, at 31; Pritchard, "Dying'-Some
Issues and Problems, 164 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Scr. 707, 711-13 (1969).
3. There has been some discussion of possible liability of health care providers for
delaying death by use of expensive mechanical devices contrary to the will of the
patient and his family. See Euthanasia Questions Stir New Debate, MED. WoRLD NEws,
Sept. 14, 1973, at 78.
4. Morison, Dying, SCIENTIFIC Am., Sept. 1973, at 54; Stevens, Do Patients Ever Have
Rights in the Timing of Their Own Death?, 8 NEw ENG. L. REv. 181 (1973).
5. Two broad types of euthanasia are generally distinguished as applicable to such
patients: active (actual rendition of a life-shortening agent), and passive (withholding of
a life-sustaining treatment). See To LIvE AND To DIE: WHEN, WHY, AND How 90 (R.
Williams ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as To LIVE AND To DIE]. Four types of euthanasia
are distinguished in Fletcher, Ethics and Euthanasia, 73 Am. J. NURSING 670, 673 (1973),
in To LIvE AND To DIE 116. On euthanasia, see, e.g., Cantor, A Patient's Decision to
Decline Life Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus Preservation of Life,
26 RUTGERS L. RFv. 228 (1972); Gurney, Is There a Right to Die?-A Study of the Law
of Euthanasia, 3 CUM.-SAm. L. REv. 235 (1972); Morris, Voluntary Euthanasia, 45 WASH.
L. REv. 239 (1970). Euthanasia is usually considered in connection with either the ir-
revocably unconscious patient, see note 15 infra, or the competent terminal patient
requesting some form of life shortening, see, e.g., Morris. supra; Kutner, Due Process
of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539 (1969).
The term "euthanasia" itself tends to stifle discussion. "Benemortasia" has been
coined to circumvent the word's emotional impact. See Hearings on Death with Dignity
Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 68-70 [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on Dying]; cf. Dyck, An Alternative to the Ethic of Euthanasia, in
To LIVE AND To DIE 102.
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theless, some courts have not hesitated to enforce the overruling by
doctors of a patient's refusal of treatment." The proper legal outcome,
however, is far from settled.
7
The doctrine of informed consent8 offers an established basis for
court resolution of the issue. Since Judge Cardozo's opinion in Schloen-
6. See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 118
U.S. App. D.C. 80, 331 F.2d 1000, rehearing denied, 118 U.S. App. D.C. 90, 331 F.2d
1010, cert. denied, 337 U.S. 978 (1964) (refusal of blood transfusion by Jehovah's Witness
overruled); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670
(1971) (22-year-old Jehovah's Witness compelled to receive a blood transfusion over her
objection).
7. See, e.g., In re Brooks' Estate, 32 I11. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (Jehovah's
Witness may refuse blood transfusion, at least where no minor children are involved
and there is no clear and present danger to society). In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372,
374-75 (D.C. App. 1972), which held that a competent adult may refuse a blood trans-
fusion, distinguished earlier cases involving compulsory rendition of medical care to
which the patient objected on religious grounds. The court noted that some cases in-
volved comatose patients or other incompetents, while lives of unborn children or the
welfare of survivors were at stake in other cases. The court stressed that whether the
patient's "current choice is competently maintained" is important, id. at 375. New
York's lower courts have reached inconsistent results. Compare Petition of Nemser, 51
Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (judge refused to intervene in a dispute
over the treatment of an 80-year-old suffering from gangrene; the patient's apparent
refusal of the operation prevailed), with Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Center v.
Levitt, 73 Misc. 2d 395, 342 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (judge appointed a guardian
to consent to an operation on an 84-year-old suffering from gangrene despite a dispute
as to his wishes). See also Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup.
Ct. 1964) (compelling treatment); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d
705 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (following patient's wishes); D. HENDiN, DEATH AS A FAct OF LIFE
66-70 (1973) (recounts cases in which patient's decision was upheld in Wisconsin and
denied in New York).
8. See generally Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAm L. RaV.
639 (1968); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628
(1970); Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970). See also 119 CONG. REc. S16335-36 (daily ed.
Sept. 11, 1973).
The doctrine of informed consent has not been recognized by appellate courts in
all American jurisdictions. See, e.g., Martin v. Stratton, 515 P.2d 1366, 1369-70 (Okla.
1973). In addition, the feasibility of informed consent has been questioned. See Fellner
& Marshall, Kidney Donor-The Myth of Informed Consent, 126 AM. J. PSYCH. 1245-51
(1970).
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare recently promulgated regulations
governing grants and contracts supporting research involving human subjects. They
include the following definition of informed consent:
"Informed consent" means the knowing consent of an individual or his legally
authorized representative, so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice
without undue inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress or other
form of constraint or coercion. The basic elements of information necessary to
such consent include:
(1) A fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, and their purposes,
including identification of any procedures which are experimental;
(2) a description of any attendant discomforts and risks reasonably to be ex-
pected;
(3) a description of any benefits reasonably to be expected;
(4) a disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures that might be ad-
vantageous for the subject;
(5) an offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures; and
(6) an instruction that the person is free to withdraw his consent and to dis-
continue participation in the project or activity at any time without prejudice to
the subject.
39 Fed. Reg. 18917 (1974).
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dorff v. Society of New York Hospital,9 courts have, in nonterminal
cases,' 0 regularly premised" the doctrine on the basic principle that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body . .*..,12 This axiom
has been restated recently in the leading case of Natanson v. Kline
3
as follows:
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going
self-determination. It follows that each man is considered to be
master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, ex-
pressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other
medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation
or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does
not permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the
patient by any form of artifice or deception.' 4
While purporting to apply the basic principle, however, courts in dif-
ferent jurisdictions have developed a wide variety of formulations that
inhibit realization of ultimate control by the patient. When a court
focuses on the doctor's therapeutic privilege to withhold information
or bases its determination of the doctor's liability on the disclosure
standards observed by the local medical community, the patient's
self-determination may be too easily overlooked.
This Note argues that, in accordance with the postulate of self-
determination, someone other than the health care provider should
set the standard and scope of disclosure. Courts should scrutinize with
care any accretions to the doctrine of informed consent that diminish
the information a patient receives or that circumscribe his entitle-
ment to consent before treatment. The stress some courts place on
interests countervailing the Schloendorff axiom may represent an im-
plicit questioning of the validity of that principle. However, this Note
contends that probing the underpinnings of the principle will reveal
even more fundamental interests which require results consistent with
9. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig,
2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957) (immunity for charitable hospitals
rejected).
10. The principle has been noted in some terminal cases as well. See, e.g., Long
Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Center v. Levitt, 73 Misc. 2d 395, 397-98, 342 N.Y.S.2d 356,
359 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
11. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
12. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S. App. D.C. 263, 271, 464 F.2d 772, 780,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9,
104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972); Collins v. Itoh, 503 P.2d 36, 40 (Mont. 1972); Congrove v.
Holmes, 308 N.E.2d 765, 769, 771 (C.P. Ross Co., Ohio 1973); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110
R.I. 606, 619, 295 A.2d 676, 685 (1972); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 596 n.30,
207 N.W.2d 297, 311 n.30 (1973).
13. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
14. Id. at 406-07, 350 P.2d at 1104.
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the axiom in those cases in which the courts engage in some variety
of balancing.
Viewed in this light, the doctrine of informed consent requires that
any competent patient should retain control over decisions about treat-
ment, even if he is suffering from a terminal illness.'0 This Note will
explore the implications of informed consent for types of voluntary
euthanasia.' 6 Most of the implications will suggest guidelines for
appropriate judicial results, but the solution to the euthanasia prob-
lem may well require legislative changes17 to minimize conflict with
present homicide and suicide laws.
I. Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent emerged from medical malprac-
tice cases involving rendition of some treatment to which the patient
had not consented.' 8 Treatment necessarily involves a touching of the
patient's body. If performed without a valid consent, it has been viewed
as an intentional 9 interference with the person-a battery.20 Expert
15. Thus, this Note is concerned only with voluntary forms of euthanasia, and not
with the problem of brain death (an alternative definition of death based on irrevocable
unconsciousness) or any definition of death for purposes of involuntary euthanasia.
Proponents of brain death have met with some success in legislatures, see KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1973), criticized in Capron and Kass, A Statutory Definition of
the Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA.
L. REv. 87, 108-11 (1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 54F (Gum. Supp. 1973). Brain
death has also received some acceptance in the courts. Kennedy, The Legal Definition of
Death, 41 MEDIco-LEGAL J. 36 (1973) (discusses Virginia case). Cf. Calabresi, Birth, Death,
and the Law, 37 PHAROS 39 (1974); Dworkin, Death in Context, 48 IND. L.J. 623 (1973).
16. Most writers have not viewed the doctrine of informed consent as central to
the case for euthanasia, see, e.g., Note, Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, 36 ALB. LJ. 674,
685-86 (1972), but a few have mentioned it, see, e.g., Survey, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort,
Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1202, 1218-24 (1973).
17. Examples of recently proposed legislation legalizing passive euthanasia include
Fla. S.B. 253 (1973 Reg. Sess.); Fla. H.B. 407 (1973 Reg. Sess.); Ore. H.B. 2997 (1973
Reg. Sess.). Active euthanasia would be permitted under Ore. S.B. 179 (1973 Reg. Sess.).
Ore. S.B. 179 (active euthanasia) received a "very rough" reception from the news-
papers and from letters by the general public. The bill was withdrawn as a result.
Ore. H.B. 2997 (passive euthanasia) died in committee despite amendments by Governor
McCall's legal staff and the assistance of the Medical Society lobby. Letter from State
Senator C.R. Hoyt to Charles H. Montange, Mar. 20, 1974 (on file with the Yale Law
Journal).
The Florida bills will apparently be reintroduced for further consideration by the
Florida legislature. However, opponents have prepared memorials to Congress encourag-
ing passage of a constitutional amendment apparently intended to overrule Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing abortions), and perhaps also to prohibit both
active and passive euthanasia, even if voluntary. Fla. S. Mem. 162 and H. Mem. 2677
(1974 Reg. Sess.).
18. See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166, aff'd, 224 I1. 300, 79 N.E. 562
(1906).
19. The intent need not be malicious. "Rather it is an intent to bring about a
result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law will not sanction."
IV. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 31 (4th ed. 1971).
20. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 270-71, 104 N.W. 12, 15-16 (1905),
overruled on other grounds, Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854
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testimony as to the standard medical community practice is not re-
quired in a battery action,21 since liability is not based on any standard
of care but rather on an unlawful touching. 22 For situations in which
the doctor performs a treatment for which no consent whatsoever has
been obtained, battery is the appropriate theory for recovery in many
jurisdictions. 2
3
However, in situations in which the patient consents to a treatment
but an undisclosed risk materializes, courts have been reluctant to
find that the physician has committed an intentional tort.24 In such
cases, physicians have generally been allowed to interpose the defense
that disclosure of the risk in question was not customary in the local
medical community. 25 This encouraged some courts to view insuffi-
cient disclosure of risks and alternatives as a failure to exercise due
care.20 A due care standard is doctrinally more consistent with negli-
gence than with battery; therefore a trend has developed to view
failure to obtain an informed consent as a tort of negligence.27
A. Information and Consent
Whether battery or negligence is the theory,28 informed consent
involves the two vital elements its name implies: the patient must be
given information on the risks involved in the treatment, and he must
assent to the treatment.2 9 The fiduciary relationship between the doc-
(1957); Schloendorff v. Society N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914);
cf. Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 473, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559 (1973); W.
PRossE, supra note 19, at 105-06, 165.
21. See, e.g., Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958)
(vasectomy performed without patient's consent); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div.
2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973) (informed consent is a battery action in New York;
proof of community standard is not necessary).
22. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512
(1972) (dictum). In addition, the doctor could be held for punitive damages if guilty
of battery. But cf. Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 600, 207 N.W.2d 297, 313 (1973).
23. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S. App. D.C. 263, 274, 464 F.2d 772, 783,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 803, 82
Cal. Rptr. 67, 76-77 (1969); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 621, 295 A.2d 676, 686 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240-41, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr.
505, 512 (1972).
25. Id.; Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827, 834 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (both "school" and"medical community" standards applicable in Texas in action based on heart surgery).
26. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972);
W. PROssER, supra note 19, at 165.
27. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
514 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 626, 295 A.2d 676, 686 (1972) (collects
the cases).
28. While most jurisdictions apparently categorize informed consent as either negli-
gence or battery, Ohio views the cause of action as valid under both theories. Belcher
v. Carter, 13 Ohio App. 2d 113, 114, 234 N.E.2d 311, 312 (1967).
29. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 8, at 630; cf. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I.
606, 628, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (1972).
Some commentators stress a third vital element: The patient must comprehend the
information which has been conveyed. See Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Con.
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tor and patient obligates the doctor to assure the presence of both
elements before undertaking a procedure.30
However, risks which are everyday knowledge need not be men-
tioned to the patient, 31 and disclosure of "material" risks is sufficient.
3 2
Furthermore, physicians will be held responsible for revealing only
such risks as are known to reasonably prudent comparable practi-
tioners.33 However, courts adopting a negligence theory for informed
consent differ greatly over what constitutes a material risk.
The view accepted by the majority of American jurisdictions bases
the duty to disclose on a community standard; it requires only such
disclosure of risks as is consistent with the practice of the local med-
ical community. 34 Expert medical testimony is required to show a
breach of local medical standards.3 5 The majority rule results from a
sent, 287 NEw ENG. J. MED. 465 (1972). For a recent proposal to increase comprehension,
see Miller & Willner, A Suggestion for Promoting Free and Informed Consent, 290
NEw ENG. J. MED. 964 (1974). Judicial development of this element will probably occur
after the notions of "information" and "consent" are more settled, although the im-
portance of comprehension has been recognized. See Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.
App. D.C. 263, 271 nn.14-15, 464 F.2d 772, 780 nn.14-15, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
30. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 246, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515
(1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 401, 350 P.2d 1093, 1101, rehearing denied,
187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
31. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 629, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972). See Shetter v.
Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 369, 409 P.2d 74, 85 (1965) (reasonable people know some
risks exist in delicate operation).
32. Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Ore. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971); Wilkinson v. Vesey,
110 R.I. 606, 629, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Center, 81
Wash. 2d 12, 25, 499 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1972).
33. See Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073, 1076-77 (D. Idaho 1973) (ortho-
pedic surgeon testified to no personal knowledge of such a risk as materialized and
introduced studies indicating it was "virtually unknown"); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 244. 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972); cf. Karriman v. Orthopedic
Clinic, 516 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1973). Thus, a physician must know, according to a medical
community standard, the risks and alternatives attendant on a proposed procedure.
34. See, e.g., Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 370, 409 P.2d 74, 86 (1965);
Stauffer v. Karabin, 492 P.2d 862, 865 (Colo. App. 1971); DiFilippo v. Preston, 53
Del. 539, 550, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (1961); Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 694, 140
N.W.2d 139, 145 (1966); Collins v. Itoh, 503 P.2d 36, 41 (Mont. 1972); ZeBarth v.
Swedish Hosp. Med. Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12. 24-26. 499 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1972); Watkins
v. Parpala, 2 Wash. App. 484, 489, 469 P.2d 974, 979 (1970).
35. Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 694, 140 N.W.2d 139, 145 (1966); Marchlewicz
v. Stanton, 213 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Mich. App. 1973) (no jury question if expert testimony
is not produced). The majority view espoused by Michigan was apparently departed
from in a lower court decision involving psychosurgery. See Note, Kaimowitz v. De-
partment of Mental Health: A Right to Be Free from Experimental Psychosurgery?,
54 B.U. L. REV. 301, 317 (1974). See also Perin v. Hayne, 210 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1973)
(court left open the informed consent issue since the plaintiff had offered no evidence
as to causation; however, citations to Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S. App. D.C. 263,
464 F.2d 772, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), and Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,
502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972), suggest that the court might entertain abandon-
ment of the old rule requiring expert testimony on the duty to disclose if the question
is properly presented). From Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing
denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960), to Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d
488 (1967), the Kansas rule seemed to be that a patient need not submit expert testi-
mony regarding standards for disclosure. However, if the doctor did submit such testimony,
then the patient had to rebut. Kansas currently limits the duty to inform to those
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view of the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient that
perceives the doctor's duty to disclose as subservient to his general
duty "to do what is best" for the patient.36 The latter duty is a func-
tion of the local medical community standard which must be estab-
lished by expert testimony.37 Since the obligation to disclose is seen
as part of, or subservient to, the more general duty, the standard of
disclosure is described as a question of medical judgment. Thus no
disclosure is required unless expert testimony indicates that otherwise
the relevant standard of medical care would be breached.3s
This view, however, threatens to emasculate the individual self-de-
termination which the doctrine of informed consent was meant to
protect. 39 The patient's right to select treatment is severely limited
when it is based only on information deemed worthy of disclosure
according to a medical community standard set by those under the
obligation to inform.40 Thus the medical community standard test
runs contrary to vesting ultimate determination of treatment ques-
tions in the patient and diminishes rather than assures his self-deter-
mination.41 Furthermore, it is open to abuse. It may be used as a de-
disclosures which a "reasonable physician" would make, Funke v. Fieldman, 512 P.2d 539,
546 (Kan. 1973), citing Tatro v. Lueken, 512 P.2d 529 (Kan. 1973). This duty depends
on the facts of each case. Thus, a community standard is not explicitly mentioned, but
may enter in determining what a "reasonable physician" would do. However, Funke
indicates that a "reasonable physician" may on no account be misleading, 512 P.2d at 548.
36. DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 550, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (1961); Grosjean v.
Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 693-94, 140 N.W.2d 139, 144-45 (1966).
37. Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 140 N.W.2d 139 (1966).
38. See, e.g., Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963); Aiken v. Clary,
396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965). The traditional medical malpractice test is in terms of the
degree of skill ordinarily possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in similar
localities. Ferrell v. Ellis, 129 Iowa 614, 105 N.W. 993 (1906). But cf. McGulpin v.
Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950) (specialist held to higher standard). But
increasingly, experts from other localities are permitted to testify as to accepted medical
standards. See, e.g., Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968). A more
general medical community standard seems to be supplanting the old locality rule.
Several rationales have been offered for the majority rule applying a community standard
to disclosure. One court mentioned a desire to encourage experimentation. Watkins v.
Parpala, 2 Wash. App. 484, 489, 469 P.2d 974, 979 (1970). Another rationale is to protect
physicians from excessive liability. Note, Informed Consent-A Proposed Standard for
Medical Disclosure, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 548, 554 (1973). Further, there is some feeling that
because "[t] he layman would have no conception of the complex nature of the problem,"
disclosure is unnecessary, Sinkey v. Surgical Associates, 186 N.W.2d 658, 662 (Iowa 1971).
Some courts even argue that the rule is necessary to avoid upsetting or driving away
patients. Stauffer v. Karabin, 492 P.2d 862 (Colo. App. 1971); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52
Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970).
39. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 407, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104, rehearing denied, 187
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30,
105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 61 (Supp. 1968).
40. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wash. App. 298, 308, 474 P.2d 909, 916 (1970).
41. An objective medical community standard of disclosure may not exist or may
be excessively difficult to establish due to the complexities of each case. Wilkinson v.
Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 623-24, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (1972 , citing Note, Informed Consent in
Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396 (1967). See also Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wash.
App. 298, 311 n.11, 474 P.2d 909, 918 n.1l (1970), citing 75 HARv. L. REv. 1445, 1447
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vice either to conceal information which might cause the patient to
forego treatment,42 or to avoid possible confrontations with patients
and their families which might be emotionally difficult for the patient
or doctor.
43
In recent years, courts in several jurisdictions44 have recognized
these objections and have abolished the medical community standard,
adopting new tests for disclosure. Seeking to retain some limits on
physician liability, the new tests utilize a reasonable man standard.
However, they apply the standard to differing elements of the case.
One scheme applies the reasonable man test to materiality of the in-
formation withheld.43 Another applies the test to causation and ap-
pears to leave materiality to a more subjective standard.46 Yet another
formulation weighs both materiality and causation according to an
objective test.
47
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. Vesey 4s con-
(1962). There is a more pragmatic objection to the majority view: It requires plaintiffs
to present expert witnesses, who are difficult to produce because of the professional
"conspiracy of silence" cdncerning malpractice. Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260,
286 A.2d 647 (1971).
42. See ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 25-26, 499 P.2d
1, 9-10 (1972) stating that "[t]he doctrine of informed consent does not require the
doctor to risk frightening the patient out of a course of treatment which sound medical
judgment dictates the patient should undertake."
43. See Davis, Uncertainty in Medical Prognosis, Clinical and Functional, 66 Aat.
J. Soc. 41 (1960). Davis reports that, in order to avoid confrontations, parents of children
stricken with polio were not told of the prognosis which the physicians had reached.
The physician in Congrove v. Holmes, 308 N.E.2d 765, 768 (C.P. Ross Co., Ohio 1973),
did not reveal risks of surgery. He stated that if he revealed "even half the complica-
tions ... , many people would refuse to have anything done and, therefore, would be
worse off." The court rejected the physician's position. See also Tatro v. Lueken, 512
P.2d 529, 537 (Kan. 1973).
Some evidence indicates that such concealment is not desirable therapeutically. I. JANIS,
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS-PSYCHOANALYTIC AND BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF SURGICAL PATIENTS
352-53, 367-71 (1958).
44. California: Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972);
District of Columbia: Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S. App. D.C. 263, 464 F.2d 772, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); New Mexico: Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d
520 (1962); New York: Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S. 2d
552 (1973); Oregon: Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Ore. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971); Rhode
Island: Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Wisconsin: Trogun v.
Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 NAV.2d 297 (1973). No controlling state court decisions
exist in Idaho, but a federal district court sitting in diversity followed Cobbs. See
Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073, 1076-77 (D. Idaho 1973). A lower court in
Ohio has rejected the community standard rule, Congrove v. Holmes, 308 N.E.2d 765,
771 (C.P. Ross Co., Ohio 1973). While lower Washington courts had divided on this
issue, compare Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wash. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970); Hunter v.
Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899, 484 P.2d 1162 (1971) (against the community standard rule),
with Watkins v. Parpala, 2 Wash. App. 484, 469 P.2d 974 (1970) (for the rule), the state's
highest court decided to retain the rule, ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Center, 81 Wash.
2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972). But cf. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
45. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 627, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972).
46. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243-45, 502 P.2d 1, 10-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
514-16 (1972).
47. Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S. App. D.C. 263, 278, 282, 464 F.2d 772, 787, 791,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
48. 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
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cluded that the patient must be given all material information neces-
sary for a decision. The character of material information could not
be determined by a "local medical group" which has no knowledge
of the individual or the unique situation involved.4  The court rea-
soned that the decision as to materiality is a human judgment which
does not require expert medical testimony, but may be determined
by the jury.50 Disclosure should extend to all facts which a reasonable
man would regard as materialF' in light of the severity of the risk
and the likelihood of its occurrence-the more severe or likely the risk,
the more probable that it is material.
5 2
Wilkinson also discussed causation. To recover in a malpractice
action for lack of informed consent, the patient must show not only
that the physician failed to disclose a material fact, but also that he,
the patient, would have refused consent had he been informed of the
fact, and that he has been injured as a result of the concealment. 3
The focus is on what the particular patient would have done, thus
wisely making the causation test more subjective than the materiality
requirement.
49. The court notes that the basis of informed consent is "the patient's right to
be the final judge to do with his body as he wills." This right "should not be delegated
to a local medical group." Id. at 625, 295 A.2d at 688.
50. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 626, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (1972). The patient
must still submit expert testimony to establish the known risks, but the jury determines
what is material. The court provided that the doctor may still adduce evidence as to
the existence of community standards.
51. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972). The court also
reasoned that no disclosure was necessary if "it would unduly agitate or undermine an
unstable patient." 110 R.I. at 628, 295 A.2d at 689. However, the criteria for adjudging
a patient unstable were not presented, nor was there any suggestion whether com-
petence or stability would be presumed, or whether the doctor or the patient must
prove that competence was or was not present.
Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S. App. D.C. 263, 278, 464 F.2d 772, 787, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972), noted that the ideal rule governing disclosure would require
revelation of all risks which the patient would feel material. However, such a sub-
jective rule was felt by the court to place an "undue demand" on the doctor to"second-guess" the patient.
52. The test is thus similar to that of Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S. App. D.C.
263, 278-79, 464 F.2d 772, 787-88, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). See also Getchell
v. Mansfield, 260 Ore. 174, 180, 489 P.2d 953, 956 (1971). The focus on magnitude of
risk and likelihood of occurrence of risks perceived by the reasonable man would
appear to make the test sufficiently clear to put the physician on notice as to the
necessary disclosure. But see Note, supra note 38.
53. The court implies approval of a subjective causation test by citing the sub-
jective testimony offered. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 629 n.12, 295 A.2d 676, 690
n.12 (1972). Generally, to show causation, one must prove that the patient would have
refused consent, though courts often do not indicate whether the standard is objective
(reasonable man) or subjective (individual). See, e.g., Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App.
358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1972); Funke v. Fieldman, 512 P.2d 539, 548-49 (Kan. 1973). But see Congrove v.
Holmes, 308 N.E.2d 765 (C.P. Ross Co., Ohio 1973). For an objective test of the patient's
refusal, see Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S. App. D.C. 263, 282, 464 F.2d 772, 791,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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However, Wilkinson unduly restricted recovery to cases in which
the patient would have refused treatment altogether. The rule should
be broader. If the patient shows that, had he been warned, he would
have delayed consent in order to attend to personal or business mat-
ters,5 4 he should recover for damages55 which he can prove resulted
from the concealment. Such a modified rule would be consistent with
the requirement of causation for tort liability,56 while increasing the
scope of protection consistently with the reasons for informed con-
sent.5
7
The California Supreme Court in Cobbs v. Grant"8 also began with
the familiar postulate of self-determination over one's body as the
basis for requiring that the physician disclose to his patient "all infor-
mation relevant to a meaningful decisional process."5 9 This court,
rejecting the community standard rule as "overbroad" and "nebulous,"
opted for a standard more protective of patient's rights. Cobbs re-
quired that known risks of death or serious bodily harm be disclosed.
The test for adequate disclosure is the patient's need for information,
54. Failure to disclose based on a purported community standard may prevent
patients from ordering their affairs to meet contingencies. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972) (information essential to chart
course knowledgeably). For example, in Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 140 N.W.2d
139 (1966), the patient consented to an operation with the understanding that he
would be home before Christmas. Undisclosed but foreseeable complications resulted in
his death. Had the risks been disclosed, the patient might well have delayed the operation.
55. The measure of damages in an informed consent tort action has not received
extensive appellate attention. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 8, at 648. Natanson
v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354
P.2d 670 (1960) (dictum), treats failure to obtain informed consent as a breach of duty
which results in liability in damages for any undisclosed risk that materializes, whether
or not the therapy was otherwise nonnegligently performed. Waltz & Scheuneman, supra
note 8, at 649, criticize this position as allowing an unjustifiably large recovery in cases
which really involve no malpractice, and propose that damages should be the dif-
ference between the patient's condition with no treatment (or alternative treatment if
such is available) and his condition after the risk materialized. Since valuation could
well be difficult if alternatives are available, they suggest that the Natanson test may
be employed in such cases. However, failure to obtain an informed consent itself con-
stitutes malpractice. Failure to inform is increasingly viewed as a breach of duty creat-
ing a tort in negligence. Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 597, 207 N.W.2d 297,
312-13 (1973). If informed consent actions are otherwise treated as malpractice cases,
the measure of damages should also be the malpractice measure: the damage resulting
from the breach of duty. In informed consent cases, the breach of duty is the failure
to inform. The damage is the materialized undisclosed risk which the patient could
not avoid because he was not informed. See Funke v. Fieldman, 512 P.2d 539, 549 (Kan.
1973). Natanson has been followed in Demers v. Gerety, 515 P.2d 645, 650 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1973) (dictum); and ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 27,
499 P.2d 1, 10 (1972) (dictum). Requiring a patient to show that he would have been
better off undergoing alternative treatment would in many cases introduce highly
speculative considerations into the damage proofs.
56. See W. PROSSER, supra note 19, at 236.
57. See pp. 1643-47 infra.
58. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
59. Id. at 242, 502 P.2d at 9-10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513 (1972).
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a need which encompasses "whatever is material to the decision."'0
The California decision leaves materiality undefined, and is unclear
whether an objective test as in Wilkinson is to be employed, or
whether a subjective test based on the individual patient is intended.
The probable explanation for the lack of clarity is that the Cobbs
court was avoiding the materiality issue by concentrating on causa-
tion. 1 In order to prevent what it saw as a risk of excessive liability
for physicians as a result of the patient's questionable hindsight, the
court established an objective test for causation: The doctor is liable
only if the trier of fact decides that a reasonable man in the patient's
position would have refused treatment when adequately informed.0 2
This causation test is inappropriate in informed consent cases. The
California court should have applied the objective test only to deter-
mine the required scope of disclosure-the materiality issue-as the
Rhode Island court did. 3 The doctor should be held responsible only
for disclosing risks a reasonable man would deem material.0 4 If a more
subjective standard forcing the doctor to guess at the need to disclose
reasonably immaterial risks were adopted, his liability would be de-
pendent on the vagaries of each patient's desire for information.,
However, once a fact has been found objectively material, the patient
should be allowed recovery if he can show that he would have refused
treatment, even unreasonably.66 In other words, the test of causation
should be more subjective.6 7 This individualized test of causation is
indicated because informed consent seeks to assure patients the right
to make even irrational decisions. Therefore, the patient's act of re-
fusal cannot be weighed by an objective or reasonable man test, nor
need it be, since nondisclosure of a material risk is the central element.
Wilkinson properly isolates and concentrates with an objective test
on the question of materiality. Cobbs likewise is a step in the right
direction for it abolishes the community standard as to what risks will
60. Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (1972).
61. Such an approach is favored in Note, supra note 38, at 553.
62. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515-16
(1972). See also Funke v. Fieldman, 512 P.2d 539, 549-50 (Kan. 1973).
63. See pp. 1639-41 supra.
64. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 8, at 640; Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606,
627, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972).
65. The physician should be held responsible for disclosing only those facts known
by reasonably prudent comparable practitioners. See note 33 supra. This is, of course,
a significant restriction on liability.
66. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 39, at 61.
67. The California court does suggest an awareness of this at one point: "The
weighing of these risks against the individual subjective fears and hopes of the patient
is not an expert skill. Such evaluation and decision is a nonmedical judgment re-
served to the patient alone." Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104
Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972).
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be deemed significant. However, Cobbs fails to arrive at a clear test
of materiality, for it sidesteps the issue by establishing an objective
causation test, thereby undercutting the basic reasons for informed
consent6 8
B. Underpinnings of the Doctrine
Judicial deviation from the basic principle of informed consent-
self-determination over one's own body69-perhaps results from a fail-
ure to probe the underpinnings of that axiom. 0 The principle im-
plies that there exist categories of decisions which an individual must
be permitted to make, even if others believe the individual decides
irrationally or incorrectly.71 It indicates that an implicit weighing of
the interests of competing decisionmakers has already taken place
and that the balance has been resolved in favor of individual choice.7 2
Courts and commentators may analyze the class of decisions reserved
to the individual to rest on John Stuart Mill's concept of freedom of
choice over matters which have a direct adverse effect 73 on no one but
68. Regarding the Cobbs causation problem, see Comment, Informed Consent After
Cobbs-Has the Patient Been Forgotten?, 10 SAN DiEGO L. REV. 913, 924-26 (1973).
The California test also involves possible liability for nondisclosure beyond the mini-
mal mandatory requirement of revelation of material risks. The court suggested that
doctors would also be liable for failure to reveal such other risks as physicians in good
standing would disclose. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 515 (1972). Thus a community standard is maintained for "minor" or in-
significant risks.
69. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp.. 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972).
70. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 401, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104, rehearing
denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y.
127, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628, 295 A.2d 676,
688 (1972).
71. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 39, at 61.
72. See Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 118
U.S. App. D.C. 80, 331 F.2d 1000, rehearing denied, 118 U.S. App. D.C. 90, 95-98, 331
F.2d 1010, 1015-18 (Burger, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). Chief Justice
Burger, then a circuit judge, felt that a hospital's effort to compel a person against
her will to accept a blood transfusion was not justiciable: "Some matters of essentially
private concern and others of enormous public concern, are beyond the reach of
judges." 118 U.S. App. D.C. at 98, 331 F.2d at 1018. Burger alludes to notions of
privacy in his discussion of the allocation of decisionmaking power. He notes that
Justice Brandeis, in speaking of the "'right to be let alone' . . . intended to include
a great many foolish, unreasonable and even absurd ideas which do not conform,
such as refusing medical treatment even at great risk." Cf. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110
R.I. 606, 624, 295 A.2d 676, 687-88 (1972).
73. Mill's structure has been challenged. "The Millsian distinction between in-
stances of harm to others and instances of harm solely to self, relied on by the
majority, would seem rarely if ever to be relevant in actuality because others are af-
fected by virtually any action which an individual takes or fails to take." Winters
v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1971) (Moore, J., concurring and dissenting),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). See also Devlin, Mill on Liberty in Morals, 32 U. CHr.
L. REv. 215 (1965).
One problem with Mill's distinction between direct and indirect effects is that in-
dividuals are affected by psychological phenomena as well as physical or material phe-
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the decisionmaker.7 4 Alternatively, courts may come increasingly to
view informed consent as a manifestation of constitutionally protected
privacy, especially after Roe v. Wade.75 However, courts have explored
nomena. The distinction might be salvaged by viewing emotional impact as an indirect
effect. In addition, it is arguable that purely psychological effects may be more easily
(cheaply) borne by the psychologically affected party, as compared to the psychological
effect of denying to an individual the right to make a decision physically affecting
only himself; cf. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1073 (D.N.J. 1972) (court holds
a New Jersey abortion statute unconstitutional and suggests that no authority has been
advanced for the contention that for purposes of general welfare a state may infringe
constitutional rights). The importance of psychological effects will be discussed later.
See pp. 1660-61 infra.
The motorcycle crash helmet cases suggest some of the difficulties in allocating de-
cisionmaking power for choices that appear primarily to affect only given individuals.
Compare American Motorcycle Ass'n v. State Police, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d
72 (1968), and People v. Fries, 42 Il. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969) (holding the helmet
requirement invalid), with Kingery v. Chapple, 504 P.2d 831 (Alas. 1972). and State
ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625 (1968), aff'd, State v. Lombardi,
110 R.I 776, 298 A.2d 141 (1972) (finding the requirement valid). See generally L.
TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 367-437 (1973).
74. See J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 6 (People's ed. 1873) ("the sole end for which mankind
are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action
of any of their number, is self-protection"). The court in American Motorcycle Ass'n
v. State Police, 11 Mich. App. 351, 353, 158 N.W.2d 72, 73-74 (1968), quotes Mill as
holding "that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, insofar as
these concern the interests of no person but himself." Mill also wrote, "Each is the
proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual. Mankind
are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by
compelling each to live as seems good to the rest." J. MILL, supra, at 8.
The Supreme Court has expressly disavowed application of Mill's views on self-de.
termination to the issue of obscenity. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68-69
& 68 n.14 (1973) (Constitution does not preclude the regulation of allegedly obscene
material exhibited in a theatre: "conduct involving consenting adults only is [not]
always beyond state regulation"). With respect to libertarian political views, see also
W. GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUsTICE 97-100 (K. Carter ed. 1971).
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Court held that a Fourteenth Amendment right
of privacy required the state to demonstrate a compelling interest to regulate a woman's
abortion. However, the Court did not enunciate a broad right to do with one's body
as one pleases. For commentary on Roe, see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Com-
ment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 926 (1973) (problems of proper adjudication);
Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HAtv. L. REv. 1 (1973) (decisionmaking power must
be reserved to the individual where the state will interfere with religious pref-
erences if it exercises authority). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54
(1972) (distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals cannot be prohibited);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (use of contraceptives in marriage
protected by right of privacy); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (one may
read what one wishes in the privacy of one's home); Hearings on Quality of Health
Care-Human Experimentation, 1973, Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1026-32 (1973).
A Pennsylvania lower court recognized the connection between privacy and the right
to refuse. In a case involving the refusal of a chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic
to submit to cancer therapy, the court upheld her freedom to refuse declaring:
In our opinion the constitutional right of privacy [citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)] includes the right of a mature competent adult to refuse to accept
medical recommendations that may prolong one's life and which, to a third person
at least, appear to be in his best interests; in short, that the right of privacy
includes a right to die with which the State should not interfere where there
are no minor or unborn children and no clear and present danger to public
health, welfare or morals. If the person was competent while being presented with
the decision and in making the decision which she did, the Court should not
interfere even though her decision might be considered unwise, foolish or ridiculous.
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the connection between informed consent and constitutional doctrine
most in the context of freedom of religion. T1 Competent, informed
patients have been held entitled to refuse treatment solely because
of religious beliefs, even if the treatment is necessary to preserve their
lives.1 7 Constitutional rights may thus indeed lie at the foundation
of informed consent doctrine, but the issue remains far from settled.78
The doctrine's underpinnings, however, may also be explained in
terms more commonly applied to tort doctrine in general. To the
extent that tort law seeks to achieve an efficient allocation of resources,
it aspires to place the responsibility for particular decisions upon the
In re Yetter, Civil No. 1973-533, at 4 (Pa. C.P. Northampton Co., June 6, 1973) (copy
on file with the Y'ale Law Journal). See also Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (personality test used by a school to identify potential drug abusers
without informed consent of the parents held to violate the student's and parents'
right of privacy), noted in 27 VAND. L. REv. 372 (1974). For an early exposition of
the right to privacy, see Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv.
193 (1891).
76. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g 306 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D.N.Y.
1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971) (Christian Scientist); Montgomery v. Board of
Retirement, 33 Cal. App. 3d 447, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1973) (denial of retirement
benefits to employee whose religious beliefs prohibited life-saving surgery, rendering
her disabled, unconstitutionally infringed employee's free exercise of religion); In re
Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972) (Jehovah's Witness); Marcus, The Forum of
Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217,
1251-54. It has also been argued that the First Amendment gives rise to a right of"mentation" (cognition, understanding, perception and emotion) and that informed
consent doctrine protects a right of mentation against "coercive intrusion." Shapiro,
Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coe-cive Use of Organic
Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 237, 253-76, 307 (1974).
77. See In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972), distinguishing John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (ordering life-saving blood
transfusion) as protecting the lives of unborn children. 294 A.2d at 374 n.3. This is
a strained interpretation of Heston; perhaps the court should have argued that Heston
was wrongly decided. In any event, to the extent that Osborne correctly characterized
Heston as protecting the lives of unborn children, Heston has perhaps been partially
overruled by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing certain abortions as within
the zone of constitutionally protected privacy). Further, if Roe weakens Heston, it cer-
tainly weakens cases like Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson,
42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d 537, 538, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (held that a
woman may be compelled to accept blood transfusions because her unborn child is
entitled to the law's protection).
A patient's custody of a minor child does not necessarily compel overruling his or
her refusal of treatment. Osborne upheld the patient's mature decision to forego a
transfusion against state intervention; the two minor children could be cared for by
rest of family and the family business would continue to provide support. 294 A.2d
at 374. In at least two reported cases, Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971) (patient involuntarily committed to a hospital for treatment
of an alleged mental illness and compelled over her objections to take tranquilizers),
and Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972), patients who
were forced by health care providers in league with lower state courts to submit to
treatment over religious objections were held to have stated causes of action under
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). On damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
see Note, Monetary Claims Under Section 1983: The Right to Trial By Jury, 8 HARV.
Civ. Ricirs-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 613, 620-22, 625-26 (1973).
78. This issue has received considerable attention in the secondary literature. See, e.g.,
Cantor, supra note 5; Survey, supra note 16; Note, Is There a Right to a Natural
Death?, 9 NEW ENG. L. REv. 293, 308-09 (1973).
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individuals who can best avoid costs arising from that decisionmak-
ing.79 This cost avoidance includes an effort to reduce the number
and severity of incorrect decisions, and an attempt to reduce the costs
of gathering and considering information in making decisions.80
Decisionmaking for purposes of informed consent may be evaluated
in terms of cost avoidance. The physician is primarily an expert in
diagnosis and treatment who can determine at less expense than the
patient the desirability of a particular treatment from a medical point
of view. However, the physician is not equipped to evaluate a treat-
ment in terms of a patient's nonmedical needs. The cost to the physi-
cian of discovering all the patient's psychological, social, and business
needs and obligations is simply too great. Only the patient knows
sufficiently his own value preferences, capacity for pain and suffering,
future business and social plans, and religious beliefs to evaluate the
desirability of a particular treatment so it will maximize the patient's
satisfaction. Moreover, a system which overtly ignored the individual
values of patients might encourage them to avoid or delay consulting
physicians for fear that their values would be disregarded.$' This
would risk deterioration of health standards at considerable cost to
society as individuals neglected to seek medical advice.
This analysis suggests that the most efficient decisionmaking method
for medical treatment places responsibility on the physician to make
sufficient medical disclosures to his patients. On the basis of both the
medical information and his own values, the patient would then be
responsible for evaluating alternative procedures proposed by the
physician and for making the ultimate decision as to the most appro-
priate treatment. The physician would be liable for insufficient dis-
closure, but the patient would bear the risks of the treatment or non-
treatment which he selected after receiving adequate information. As
the previous discussion indicated, recent informed consent cases have
79. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS (1969). Tort law, of course,
also seeks goals other than efficient allocation of resources.
80. Cf. id. at 26-28.
81. Cf. Lacy v. Harris Co. Welf. Unit, Civil No. 74-H-124 (S.D. Tex., filed Jan.
22, 1974). In Lacy, a § 1983 case, a blood transfusion was recommended for an infant
in Florida. The parents, Jehovah's Witnesses, had the child flown to a Texas hospital
which treated such patients without transfusions. The plaintiffs alleged that the
Florida physician told a hospital and welfare unit in Texas that the infant was in
immediate danger of death. The welfare unit secured a court order, without notice,
making the child a ward of the state. The sheriff then transferred the Lacy infant
to a general hospital where he received blood transfusions. Complaint of plaintiffs,
id.; Letter from Patrick J. Leston to Charles H. Montange, Apr. 9, 1974 (copy on file
at Yale Law Journal).
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moved in this direction of an economically efficient allocation of
decisionmaking authority.
8 2
II. Implications for Euthanasia
Society engages in a denial of death.8 3 This denial of death entails
two attitudes which must be squarely confronted and overcome in
order to achieve reasoned discussion of voluntary euthanasia. First,
the denial has encouraged the view that society attaches unqualified
paramount value to human life, or, put another way, that society en-
gages in thoroughgoing protection of life. In actuality such protection
is an illusion, for society has tended to prevent only direct takings of
life, while permitting the indirect, but statistically certain, deaths.s4
For example, the recent reduction of speed limits on highways during
the energy shortage made clear that the higher speeds tolerated for
years have resulted in a substantially higher death toll.s6 Death of a
human being should be of equal concern whether direct or indirect.
Direct takings, however, would confront the denial by shattering the
illusion, whereas the illusion may be maintained when the takings
are indirect. Voluntary euthanasia is sufficiently open and direct86
that it constitutes an explicit challenge to the illusion.
Second, denial of death has made many unable to appreciate that
a dying person may accept the prospect of death "with equanimity
82. This analysis applies to other than doctor-patient relations. See Fleming v.
Delta Airlines, 359 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (airline owes duty to warn passenger-
in this case a doctor-of expected turbulence so that he might choose for himself
whether he is "physically and emotionally capable of undertaking the trip" and wishes
to do so), noted in 42 FORDHAN L. REV. 698 (1974); Smith v. Lewis, 107 Cal. Rptr. 95,
101 (attorney should disclose information relevant to divorce settlement), deleted from
reporter due to hearing granted, 31 Cal. App. 3d 677 (1973); Freese v. Lemmon, 210
N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1973) (physician may be liable for injury to third party caused by the
automobile of patient who experienced seizure, where doctor failed to warn patient of
possibility of seizures). In each case the defendant may be seen as the optimal cost avoider.
83. See, e.g., A. TOYNBEE, Changing Attitudes Toward Death in the Modern World,
in MAN'S CONCERN WITH DEATH 129 (1968); Kfibler-Ross, Life and Death: Lessons from
the Dying, in To LIvE AND To DIE, supra note 5, at 150-59; Wahl, The Physician's Treat-
ment of the Dying Patient, 164 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sm. 759 (1969); Hearings on Dying,
supra note 5, at 4, 12-13, 114-17.
84. Calabresi, Reflections on Medical Experimentation in Humans, 98 DAEDALUS
387 (1969). Calabresi points out that society seems quite willing to trade lives in order
to achieve cheaper social progress. For example, society knows statistically that deaths
will result from unsafe mines, automobiles, and airports but nevertheless refuses to spend
the money to save the lives. Ely adverts to the anomaly of society's preference for "in-
direct" as opposed to "direct" taking of life as "the psychological phenomenon that
keeps bombardiers sane-the fact that it is somehow easier to 'terminate' those you
cannot see .... ." Ely, supra note 75, at 927. Adverse psychological effects of direct
taking of life do, however, affect people's utility curves. See pp. 1660-61 infra.
85. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1974, at 30, col. 4; id., Nov. 27, 1973, at 31, col. 4.
86. Cf. Cantor, supra note 5, at 243-45.
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and without mental disturbance."87 This in turn prompts the attitude
that a decision to die by a terminal patient is a manifestation of men-
tal incompetency; hence that a terminal patient cannot competently
consent to any form of euthanasia.88
Once one begins to see through these attitudes, the question be-
comes not, "Why make an exception permitting a death?" but rather,
"What exceptions should be made?"89 This latter question may be
addressed in part through the doctrine of informed consent.
The patient's right to an informed consent makes no sense without
a right to an informed refusal. The right to refuse should be extended
to the dying patient, for his decision on proffered treatment is no
different from that involved in any other medical situation.90 The
individual continues to know best his own value preferences, ca-
pacity for pain and suffering, and uncompleted business and social
obligations. He remains the optimal cost avoider.
The problem of euthanasia can be viewed as a continuum of situa-
tions requiring implementation of the patient's right to be the de-
cisionmaker. At one end of the continuum is the nonterminal patient
confronted with risks and alternatives in selecting treatment. Next is
the terminal patient deciding whether to submit to life-sustaining
therapy. Further along the continuum comes the terminal patient
87. E. KUBLER-Ross, supra note 2, at 112-37; A. WEISMAN, ON DYING AND DENYING 30-31
(1972). But cf. Feifel, Perception of Death, 164 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 669 (1969).
88. Another explanation for attitudes toward voluntary euthanasia is that physicians
psychologically are oriented more toward prolonging life or "winning." Hearings on
Dying, supra note 5, at 46-51.
89. Cf. Calabresi, supra note 84.
90. See Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See
also In re Yetter, Civil No. 1973-533 (Pa. C.P. Northampton Co., June 6, 1973) (copy on
file with the Yale Law Journal); Sullivan, The Dying Person-His Plight and His Right,
8 NEw ENG. L. REv. 197 (1973) (describes two cases involving refusal); 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, supra note 39, at 61:
The very foundation of the doctrine [of informed consent] is every man's right
to forego treatment or even cure if it entails what for him are intolerable con-
sequences or risks, however warped or perverted his sense of values may be in the
eyes of the medical profession, or even of the community, so long as any distortion
falls short of what the law regards as incompetency. Individual freedom here is
guaranteed only if people are given the right to make choices which would gen-
erally be regarded as foolish ones. Thus the Jehovah's witness should have the
legal right to refuse-on religious grounds which seem mistaken to most of us-
the blood transfusion which is needed to save his life ....
Cantor, supra note 5, at 261-62, points out, however, that approval of active euthanasia
is not compelled by the notion of a right of refusal.
The right to refuse treatment was recognized in controversial Provision Four in the
American Hospital Association version of the "Patient's Bill of Rights." This pro-
vision was not included in the Patient's Bill of Rights as enacted in Minnesota. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 688 (Supp. VI, 1973). See also H. DENENBERG, CITIZENS BILL OF HOSPITAL
RIGHTS 6 (1973); Annas & Healey, The Patient Rights Advocate: Redefining the Doctor-
Patient Relationship in tile Hospital Context, 27 VAND. L. REv. 243, 255-57, 265-68 (1974);
Curran, The Patient's Bill of Rights Becomes Law, 290 NEw ENG. J. MED. 32-33 (1974).
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requesting the discontinuance of a life-sustaining treatment. Finally
there is the terminal patient requesting that his life be shortened by
rendition of a death-inducing agent.
The doctrine of informed consent requires that the competent,
nonterminal patient in a nonemergency situation be given a chance
to consent or refuse.91 The situation is no different for the terminal
patient advised by his doctor to undergo a particular treatment. He
should likewise have a choice, since the decision involved is analyti-
cally the same as in the first case.
92
However, the case of the competent terminal patient requesting
discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment presents several problems.
Arguably, once a patient submits to a life-sustaining treatment, the
physician has an obligation not only to him but also to society to
maintain him, as a minimum, in his present condition. 93 In addition,
a patient is sometimes viewed as submitting to the physician's "profes-
sional standards" or "school of practice" when he requests treatment.94
According to this view, the physician may thereafter treat the patient
according to his school, which may mean that termination of treatment
before death will not be permitted.
This argument forces the patient to choose between extreme alterna-
tives. The patient is compelled either to forego treatment altogether
or, once treatment commences, to submit completely to the physician's
decisions. This failure to honor the patient's decision to terminate
treatment converts the initial consent into a contract of adhesion from
which the patient is permitted no escape even though new facts might
be brought to his attention after his initial consent.
The primary duty of the physician should not be only to act in the
best interests of the patient as defined by some school of practice, but
rather to act in the best interests of the patient as the patient himself
views those best interests. Self-determination, the basis of informed
91. Cf. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 39, at 61; Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.
App. D.C. 263, 271-74, 281-82, 464 F.2d 772, 780-83, 790-91, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
92. See Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See
also Sullivan, supra note 90, at 197 (cases discussed); In re Yetter, Civil No. 1973-533
(Pa. C.P. Northampton Co., June 6, 1973) (copy on file with the Yale Law Journal).
93. See Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legis-
lation, 42 MINN. L. REY. 969, 1042 (1958).
94. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 583, 279 A.2d
670, 673 (1971); cf. Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
118 U.S. App. D.C. 80, 89, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009, rehearing denied, 118 US. App. D.C.
90, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). See also Hearings on Dying, supra
note 5, at 81-83. "Professional standards" or "school of practice" refers to the basic
theory of medicine under which the health care provider is trained. To that extent,
the notion distinguishes medical doctors, osteopaths, and chiropractors. See D. HARNEY,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 101-07 (1973); Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice,
11 Hous. L. REv. 1, 29-32 (1973).
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consent, implies that a competent patient must have the right to re-
define his best interests for the duration of a medical procedure.
Hence, the patient should be able to withdraw his consent at any time
and discontinue the treatment.
This passive euthanasia presents fewer difficulties than the final case
of active rendition of a death-inducing agent once a competent termi-
nal patient so requests. In that situation, another person is involved
who assists in ending the patient's life. Such assistance renders the
person liable to prosecution for homicide. Nor can this conclusion be
escaped by analyzing the other's act as merely an extension of the pa-
tient's will9" since consent is not usually a defense to homicide.9
Nevertheless, the difficulty of distinction between active and passive
euthanasia should be recognized. Because these cases are on a con-
tinuum, there may be little or no substantive difference between
termination of treatment and active rendition of a death-provoking
agentyt Termination of treatment may involve turning off a respirator
switch whereas active rendition may involve giving an injection. A
physical act by a third person which promotes a less prolonged dying
process is involved in each instance. Termination, however, may seem
less direct than active rendition and therefore more acceptable. On
the other hand, active rendition maximizes the self-determination of
the terminal patient by allowing the maximal choice over the timing
of death. The alternatives in the terminal situation are not living or
dying; they are either a prolonged death or a quicker death that main-
tains what the patient regards as his dignity. Granting choice over
timing of death to -a terminal patient need not conflict with concern
for preservation of life. Preservation of life becomes grotesque when
forced on a competent terminal patient who prefers a more rapid end.
Concepts of sanctity of life should be recognized as not absolute;98
they do not inevitably imply that society should deny the decision of
a terminal patient electing euthanasia, either active or passive.99
95. See, e.g., Note, supra note 16, at 694.
96. See S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 15 (2d ed. 1969)
(consent is no defense except in some sports contests).
97. Cf. G. WILLIAMS, SANCrITY oF LIFE 319 (1958). For an attempt to distinguish,
see Hearings on Dying, supra note 5, at 20-21.
98. See Reeves, When Is It Time to Die? Prolegomenon to Voluntary Euthanasia,
8 NEW ENG. L. REV. 183, 194 (1973).
99. Two recent proposals for the rendition of euthanasia neglect the implications of
informed consent. Glanville Williams, recognizing the precarious legal position of health
care providers in deciding on proper treatment of terminal patients, has called for
legislation leaving euthanasia to the physician's discretion. Williams, Euthanasia, 41
MEDICO-LEGAL J. 14, 16 (1973). Williams favors a statute legalizing euthanasia in order
to minimize the risk of lawsuits. The second proposal is to analyze the discontinuance
of treatment as an omission, rather than as an act, thus producing no criminal liability.
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III. Closing Competency Loopholes
Even in those jurisdictions which have eliminated the medical com-
munity standard as the test for adequacy of disclosure, physicians may
still escape liability for failure to disclose material information. This
is true for two reasons. First, the patient may be deemed incom-
petent, in which case information need be provided not to the patient
but only to the family. 100 Second, the physician might feel the patient
would be "upset" by the information and therefore withhold the rele-
vant facts on grounds of therapeutic privilege. 101
These grounds for failing to provide information may be abused,
creating a loophole through which the implications of informed con-
sent may be avoided. Because of his lack of expertise in comparison
to the physician, the patient must rely heavily upon the doctor for
information concerning the quality and nature of the treatment.10 2
It has been suggested that physicians in fact attempt to manipulate or
However, turning off a respirator and failing to turn on a respirator which is auto-
matically programmed to stop every 24 hours, are not morally different; distinguishing
the former as an act seems artificial. See id. at 21. See also Fletcher, Prolonging Life,
42 WASH. L. REV. 999, 1007 (1967); Kamisar, supra note 93, at 982 n.41. Because the
distinction between acts and omissions is vague, an effort has been made to lend
substance to the "act" versus "omission" dichotomy by looking to standard medical
practice in a community to determine whether the doctor's behavior constitutes an act
or omission. See Fletcher, supra; cf. Gurney, supra note 5, at 243-44. The argument is
that if doctors do not generally treat a dying patient under certain circumstances, then
failure to treat is an omission and no liability arises.
Neither doctor nor profession should have legal discretion to determine whether
euthanasia will be rendered; cf. Hearings on Dying, supra note 5, at 75. If a decision
to die is to be made, it should be made by the patient himself if competent, and
not by the patient's physician or by a medical community standard. Further, there is
evidence that doctors are neither trained nor better able to make the decision. See
B. BiRD, TALKING WITH PATIENTS 77 (2d ed. 1973); E. KOBLER-ROSs, supra note 2, at 11-12,
18-21; Hearings on Dying, supra note 5, at 51. See also Kamisar, supra note 93, at
992-93, 996. Medical literature is beginning to examine the problem of such decision-
making. See Duff & Campbell, Aforal and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery,
289 NEw ENG. J. Mm. 890 (1973) (investigation of deliberate infant deaths); Shaw,
Dilemmas of "Informed Consent" in Children, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 885 (1973) (treat-
ment of critically ill children). See generally Smith, On Letting Some Babies Die, HASt-
INGS CENTER STUDIES, May 1974, at 37 (discusses Shaw and Duff & Campbell articles);
Letters to the Editor, 290 NEW ENG. J. MED. 518, 864 (1974).
Another line of thought suggests that motive, as opposed to intent, be reintroduced
into the criminal law. See, e.g., Kutner, supra note 5, at 549; Note, supra note 16, at
675. According to this view, good faith rendition of euthanasia derives from a good
motive, and should therefore not be punished, or should be punished as a lesser offense
than murder; cf. Parry-Jones, Criminal Law and Complicity in Suicide and Attempted
Suicide, 13 MED., Sc. & L. 110 (1973).
100. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
514 (1972).
101. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972).
102. See Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S. App. D.C. 263, 273, 464 F.2d 772, 782, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). In economic terms, this reliance is the product of the
high cost to the patient of informing himself of the relevant medical information other
than through his physicians. He cannot readily determine for himself the quality of
the care which he is receiving, and must rely on self-regulation by physicians, or on
standards set by law to assure that quality medical services are provided.
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enhance patient uncertainty in order to preserve power over the pa-
tient in the doctor-patient relationship. 10 3 Such control over the pa-
tient, being contrary to interests in self-determination sought to be
protected by informed consent, must be restrained. Consequently, the
courts should be particularly alert to prevent manipulation of the
patient. This concern may be expressed by the formulation of ade-
quate legal safeguards to control determinations of competency and
the use of therapeutic privilege.
Unfortunately, some courts tend to confuse competency to consent
with competency to receive certain "upsetting" information. 04 Fur-
ther, even when the concepts are kept separate, adequate legal tests
protective of patient interests have not been forthcoming. This Note
will examine separately the two notions, and offer approaches de-
signed to maintain and safeguard patient self-determination.
A. Competency to Consent
Courts generally except from the requirement of informed consent
persons who are not competent. 05 Information need not be tendered
nor consent obtained from an incompetent patient, though an in-
formed consent must be obtained from the patient's guardian. 00 The
definition of competency is critical. It must be formulated consistently
with the objective of informed consent-to secure for the patient the
right to forego treatment even if the medical profession or society
103. See Waitzkin & Stoeckle, The Communication of Information about Illness, 8
ADV. PSYCHOSON!. MED. 180, 185-89 (1972). This is not to suggest that all physicians
manipulate uncertainty, nor that the medical profession has a monopoly on such
manipulation.
104. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972), presents
a test for competency which may reflect confusion with physicians' claims of therapeutic
privilege to withhold upsetting information from the patient:
A disclosure need not be made beyond that required within the medical com-
munity when a doctor can prove by a preponderance of the evidence [that] he
relied upon facts which would demonstrate to a reasonable man the disclosure
would have so seriously upset the patient that the patient would not have been
able to dispassionately weigh the risks of refusing to undergo the recommended
treatment.
Id. at 246, 502 P.2d at 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
The requirement of dispassionate evaluation of risks undermines the doctrine of in-
formed consent which requires that a patient be permitted to refuse treatment even
for reasons others regard as irrational or hastily conceived. Further, Cobbs does not
explain why medical community standards exist for disclosure to incompetent patients.
Elsewhere in the opinion the court strongly criticized the notion of medical com-
munity standards, calling them "nebulous" and charging that they vest doctors "with
virtual absolute discretion." Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
105. See, e.g., id. at 244, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514. The Schloendor/f
principle as stated by Judge Cardozo presupposes that the person is of "sound mind."
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
106. See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 156, 157-58, 126 F.2d 121, 122-23
(1941).
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would feel the reasons to be irrational. 07 At the outset, it should be
noted that competency may be defined in different ways for different
purposes.'08 Therefore, the discussion following will elaborate a con-
cept of competency applicable specifically for informed consent to
medical treatment.
Judicial opinions dealing with informed consent generally do not
articulate tests for competency. Apparently courts are usually content
to rely on physicians' unguided judgments as to what constitutes com-
petency to consent. However, some courts have been successful in
establishing a legal test for competency which both serves the interests
of informed consent and avoids confusion with therapeutic privilege.
The Supreme Court of Washington set forth such a test of com-
petency in Grannum v. Berard.109 Competency is presumed; to over-
come this presumption, clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is
necessary. The test of competency is the same as that used to deter-
mine the capacity of an individual to execute an agreement. 110 Thus,
the question is whether the person at the time of making the agree-
ment possessed sufficient reason to understand the nature, terms, and
effect of the agreement."' This test focuses on the patient's capacity
to comprehend his situation, risks, and alternatives. It does not import
an examination of whether the patient's choice is rational or dispas-
sionately conceived, but allows a patient to make decisions which may
seem to others to be unreasonable."1
2
B. Therapeutic Privilege: The Patient's Competency to Receive
Certain Information
Many courts have permitted doctors to exercise a therapeutic privi-
lege to withhold information which they believe might seriously upset
or depress patients. 1 3 Concealment is thus permitted even from an
107. See p. 1653 infra.
108. See Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1973) (competency to plead
guilty is different from competency to stand trial).
109. 70 Wash. 2d 304, 422 P.2d 812 (1967).
110. See id. at 307, 422 P.2d at 814.
111. Peterson v. Eritsland, 69 Wash. 2d 588, 594, 419 P.2d 332, 336 (1966); Woods
v. Dunlop, 510 P.2d 260, 264 (Wash. App. 1973). See also Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash.
2d 16, 22, 431 P.2d 719, 723 (1967).
112, See In re Yetter, Civil No. 1973-533, at 5 (Pa. CP. Northampton Co., June 6,
1973) (copy on file with the Yale Law Journal); cf. Woods v. Dunlop, 510 P.2d 260,
265 n.4 (Wash. App. 1973): "If a person possesses the mental capacity to contract, and
voluntarily executes a release in exchange for something of value, the mere fact that
such party makes an improvident or bad bargain, in and of itself, is not a sufficient
basis to avoid the effect of the release .... ." But cf. Demers v. Gerety, 515 P.2d 645,
654 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (concurring opinion).
113. See Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827, 834-35 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d
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apparently competent patient. In Nishi v. Hartwell,114 a recent Ha-
waiian case, information was concealed from a competent patient on
grounds of therapeutic privilege, and was also concealed from the
patient's wife. The court held that no disclosure to the family was
necessary, since the patient was competent, even when information
was concealed from the patient to avoid "upsetting" him."
15
This decision fails to consider the interest of the patient and his
family in receiving information so they might prepare for contingen-
cies. Furthermore, it fails to provide protection against manipulating
the consent of the patient by selective provision of information.
Finally, although the Hawaii court avoided this analysis, the invoca-
tion of therapeutic privilege implies a judgment that the patient is
incompetent to receive certain material information which might
be distressing. It is contradictory at the same time to view him as
competent to consent. Meaningful consent requires disclosure of
material information. If a patient is not competent to receive all
material information, then he is not competent to give a valid consent.
In such a case consent should be sought from an informed family or
guardian.
Canterbury v. Spence"06 recognized that the "physician's privilege
to withhold information for therapeutic reasons must be carefully
circumscribed . . . for otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule
itself." 117 Canterbury unfortunately places only an outer limit on the
privilege,"l8 but it does suggest that disclosure to a close relative is
necessary if the privilege is exercised. The opinion represents a move-
670 (1960) (possible privilege to withhold information if disclosure seriously jeopardizes
the recovery of unstable patient); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965); Watson
v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 159, 136 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1964) ("Any conflict between [the
doctor's primary duty to do what is best for the patient] and that of a frightening
disclosure ordinarily should be resolved in favor of the primary duty"); ZeBarth v.
Swedish Hosp. Med. Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 25-26, 499 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1972); Waltz &
Scheuneman, supra note 8, at 64142.
114. 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970). In this case, a "well-educated" dentist was
not told about the hazards of injection of radio-opaque contrast medium as he was
"frightened," had hypertension, and had heart disease, even though he was "mentally
competent and had the capacity to act." The dentist was paralyzed from the waist
down with loss of control of his bowel and bladder, a known risk of the contrast
medium. Id. at 190-93, 199, 473 P.2d at 118-20, 123.
115. Id. at 198-99, 473 P.2d at 122-23.
116. 150 U.S. App. D.C. 263, 464 F.2d 772, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
117. Id. at 280, 464 F.2d at 789. This recognition is not surprising since claims of
therapeutic privilege to conceal information achieve the same results as assertions of
a community standard against disclosure. Since Canterbury rejected the community
standard rule, the court quite properly applied the same logic to cut back therapeutic
privilege.
118. Id. The court forbade "paternalistic" use of the privilege to engineer a com-
petent patient's consent to an operation by withholding information which might prompt
the patient to forego the treatment.
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ment toward viewing invocation of therapeutic privilege as equivalent
to an assertion that the patient is incompetent.
Doctors would be caught between Scylla and Charybdis'" if they
are restricted in the use of therapeutic privilege but yet are held liable
for making frightening disclosures to competent patients. Unfortu-
nately there are indications in some jurisdictions that physicians will
be held liable in damages for mental anguish caused by disclosures. 120
Any tendency of the law in the direction of holding doctors liable for
any honest disclosures must be closely scrutinized, for it may impede
the flow of material information to the patient.
In place of permissive judicial approaches allowing therapeutic
privilege and of intimations that physicians may be liable for frighten-
ing disclosures, the law should concentrate on developing a duty to
inform patients carefully of material information, even if it is dis-
tressing.' 2 1 Requiring a tactful disclosure would provide the patient
with the information necessary to make an informed decision while
avoiding excessive discomfort in the patient. 22 The interest in self-
determination of a competent patient is not served by distorted infor-
119. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 212 (Anchor ed. 1963) (translates the dreadful couple
as Skylla and Kharybdis).
120. In the New Zealand case of Furniss v. Fitchett, 1958 N.Z.L.R. 396, 404, a doctor
informed a husband of his wife's mental condition; he then sprang the news on her
in a divorce proceeding. The court stated that "in the circumstances . . . , the doctor
owed to his patient at common law a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that no
expression of his opinion as to her mental condition should come to her knowledge."
The case elicited the suggestion that it meant that a doctor owed a duty to be tactful
in his explanation. Inglis, Furniss v. Fitchett: A Footnote, 34 N.Z.L.J. 235, 236 (1958).
An American case similar on its facts to Furniss is Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134
(S.D. 1974) (physician's disclosure of mental problems of ex-wife to ex-husband's at-
torney in child custody contest is breach of physician-patient privilege). See also Horne
v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973). Some commentators have felt that there
is no Furniss liability for disclosure in the United States since recovery for emotional
harm requires some "impact." Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 8, at 641 n.48. However,
several cases indicate that "impact" does not represent an obstacle to recovery for
distressing disclosure. See, e.g., Winik v. Jewish Hosp. of Brcoklyn, 31 N.Y.2d 936, 293
N.E.2d 95, 340 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1972), aff'g 35 App. Div. 2d 982, 317 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1970)
(no recovery where fear of cancer not reasonable nor attributable to surgeon's negligence);
Trapp v. Metz, 28 N.Y.2d 913, 271 N.E.2d 697, 323 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1971), rev'g 35 App. Div.
2d 851, 317 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1970) (patient may recover for anxiety due to mistaken
diagnosis); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S2d 996 (1958)
(liability for starting cancerphobia); Kraus v. Spielberg, 37 Misc. 2d 519, 236 N.Y.S.2d
143 (Stup. Ct. 1962) (liability for psychic injury but only if disclosure is grossly negligent,
capricious, not well founded, and induces harmful therapy). See also D'Ambra v. United
States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1973) (bystander parent may recover for mental anguish
upon seeing child negligently injured, "impact" being found in the sensory observation);
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969) (negligently
induced mental trauma supports a cause of action but not as to third parties); cf.
Jacobs v. Theimer, 507 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
121. Cf. Inglis, supra note 120.
122. Cf. Hearings on Dying, supra note 5, at 11 (Kilbler-Ross testified that dying
patients could receive information as long as they were given "hope").
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mation.123 Furthermore, there is evidence that patients desire a full
disclosure, even of distressing information. 24 Courts should permit
only one exception to this rule of full tactful disclosure. A physician
should exercise a therapeutic privilege to withhold information from
a competent patient when the patient expressly waives his right to a
disclosure.125 However, in order to avoid abuse, courts should insist
that the waiver be express and unequivocal, and not a doctor's infer-
ence from subjective impressions of the competent patient's behavior.126
C. Competency and the Dying Patient
It might be argued that a decision by a terminal patient to refuse
treatment provides prima facie evidence of mental incompetency or is
itself so irrational that it should be disregarded. However, given the
patient's implicit choice between prolonged dying or more rapid
death, a decision to die may be quite reasonable even if other indi-
viduals or groups in our society judge it unacceptable for themselves.
If a terminal patient were to decide to die for what others would
deem irrational reasons, the decision should still be honored; in-
formed consent protects all decisions by competent patients, rational
or irrational. 127 This proposition was recognized in In re Yetter,1
28
a Pennsylvania lower court case which held a schizophrenic sufficiently
123. The communication of information also serves other interests, including en-
hancement of the accuracy of history-taking, provision of more useful medical records,
augmentation of patients' compliance with therapeutic regimens, increase of patients'
satisfaction, and improvement of patients' physiologic and psychologic responses to
therapy. See Waitzkin & Stoeckle, supra note 103, at 183-85.
124. See, e.g., Alfidi, Informed Consent-A Study of Patient Reaction, 216 J.A.M.A.
1325 (1971). This study of patients informed of "serious" complications of angiography
concludes that "the vast majority of patients desired this information" and "a straight-
forward statement of complications will result in only a small percentage of patients
refusing a special procedure." Id. at 1329.
125. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
516 (1972) (allows waiver).
126. Waiver of informed consent is suspect, for the patient "may be ignorant, con-
fused, overawed by the physician, or frightened by the hospital . . . ." or ashamed to
take the physician's time by obtaining information. See Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.
App. D.C. 263, 274 n.36, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.36, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), citing
Note, supra note 8, at 1545-51. Thus it may be argued that the importance of self-
determination is so great that informed consent may never be waived in a nonemergency
situation. However, waiver may be acceptable if courts ensure that the patient is not
intimidated into waiving an informed consent by pressure from a hurried physician. If
the patient clearly understands that the physician would willingly give the information
and that waiver means that the physician will make the final decisions, waiver might
be permitted, since the patient may determine that the emotional cost to himself of
the information or of the decisionmaking is too great.
127. See note 90 supra.
128. Civil No. 1973-533 (Pa. C.P. Northampton Co., June 6, 1973) (copy on file with
the Yale Law Journal).
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competent to refuse life-saving surgery even though the patient's
grounds for refusal were considered by some as irrational.
129
Some commentators have argued that terminal patients may be par-
ticularly vulnerable to the influence of family members, drugs, pain,
or financial factors.13 0 These contentions basically pose the problem
of coercion of the terminal patient's decision. Coercion13' may take
the form of subtle pressure from other individuals, unconscious mo-
tivations, or simple failures to comprehend information in the form
in which it is conveyed. The concern is that coercion of the terminal
patient's decision will increase the number and frequency of incorrect
decisions by the patient-decisions which are irreversible' 32-imposing
societal costs greater than the costs if the responsibility were placed
on the individual's family, physicians and the state. If that were the
case, it might be argued that the state should override the patient's
expressed will. However, the state should avoid coercing an individual
to protect him from coercion if some less drastic way of vindicating
the state's interests is available. The state can structure its approach
so that only patients who are relatively uncoerced may make the ulti-
mate decision as to treatment, striving to assure that the patient makes
the decision with genuine understandinga'33 of information material
to the decision. Furthermore, even if the issue is a close one, interests
in privacy argue that society opt for an approach encouraging self-
determination; voluntary euthanasia is not espoused simply to alle-
129. Id. at 2-3. The case involved a 60-year-old with possible breast cancer. At the
hearing, she focused on fear of surgery as a reason for refusal. Other witnesses sug-
gested that the patient's reasons included, inter alia, the fear that the operation would
prevent a movie career.
130. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 93, at 991-92, 985-89; Hearings on Dying, supra
note 5, at 26.
131. On the issue of coerced consent, see Shapiro, supra note 76, at 316-20 (coercion
to consent in prisons). See generally J. KArz, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS
609-724 (1972). The fact that the alternative of refusal must be available for consent to
be uncoerced was recognized explicitly in the Nuremburg judgments. See 2 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIIINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 181-83 (1948) (excerpts
from "The Medical Case"). See also Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974)
(held Department of Health, Education, and Welfare regulations to be arbitrary and
unreasonable since they do not sufficiently protect welfare clients against coercion to
agree to sterilization).
132. Kamisar argues that voluntary euthanasia should not be permitted because "the
consequence of error is so irreparable," Kamisar, supra note 93, at 1013. Kamisar's
point is apparently that the patient may be nonterminal. That the refusal of treatment
in a nonterminal situation may result in harm is, however, a part of the price the
doctrine of informed consent must pay in order to assure self-determination. The
way to reduce possible error is to maximize the supply of accurate information to
the decisionmaker (here, the competent patient), not to deprive him of choice.
133. For a recent proposal discussing procedures to assure understanding in the
medical context, see Miller and Willner, A Suggestion for Promoting Free and Informed
Consent, 290 NEW ENG. J. MED. 964 (1974). Many of the problems of coercion and un-
derstanding may be handled by a suitable test for competency. See p. 1653 supra.
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viate pain, 34 but rather to preserve to the terminal patient his last
meaningful freedom, that of control over the time of his death.13  If
the terminal patient is competent according to the Grannum test,13
then he has the same right to self-determination through informed
consent as his brethren with more comforting prospects for longevity.
There is evidence that nondisclosure to dying patients is an ac-
cepted practice among doctors. 13 7 Apparently, a strong feeling exists
that a dying patient would be shocked, depressed, or otherwise ad-
versely affected if he were acquainted with the facts, or that he usually
knows he is dying anyway.' 3 8 On the other hand, from the patient's
point of view, a majority of Americans want to be able to tell their
doctor to let them die if they suffer from an incurable condition. 3
Furthermore, dignity of the patient, informed consent, and the oppor-
tunity to arrange one's affairs dictate that the patient should be told
of his condition.
By either ignoring the dying patient's wishes as irrational or failing
134. Alleviation of pain was cited as the only reason for voluntary euthanasia in
Kamisar, supra note 93, at 1008.
135. See Szasz, in Symposium on the Aging Poor, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 45, 79 (1972);
Szasz, Illness and Indignity, 227 J.A.M.A. 543-45 (1974). See also Rudikoff, The Problem
of Euthanasia, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1974, at 65: "Advocates of euthanasia do not in fact
urge it as public policy, but merely as a possible private alternative which should be
removed from the criminal category."
To refuse to permit the dying patient to control his time of death may also work
financial and emotional hardship on the patient and his family. If society deprives
the competent terminal patient of his right to time his death, then society should
reimburse him and his family for the full costs of such deprivation. Commentators
suggesting that society has such a right to prolong the death of a terminal patient
generally do not view society as owing any reimbursement, apparently due to as-
serted state interests in preserving life or morals. See generally Kamisar, supra note 93.
But cf. Venes & Huttenlocher, Letter to the Editor, 290 NEW ENG. J. MED. 518 (1974);
note 3 supra.
136. See p. 1653 supra.
137. See, e.g., Hackett & Weisman, Denial as a Factor in Patients with Heart Disease
and Cancer, 164 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 802, 805, 808-11 (1969); Euthanasia Questions
Stir New Debate, supra note 3, at 73-81. But cf. B. BIRD, TALKING WITH PATIENTs 79 (2d
ed. 1973). Dr. Bird feels that the trend is to let patients know of their impending death.
"[T]he need to assure this right [of the terminal patient to know his condition] seems
obvious and there is little argument to be brought against it." However, "[many
doctors have a dread of death so great they can scarcely function in its presence." Id.
at 77. Some efforts are now being made to train physicians to cope with the terminally
ill. See, e.g., Artiss & Levine, Doctor-Patient Relation in Severe Illness, 288 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1210 (1973). Keeping the dying person uninformed about his condition is a rela-
tively recent historical development. In the Middle Ages, it was the clear responsibility
of others, particularly physicians, to inform the dying patient, "and for centuries they
executed it faithfully." Ares, Death Inside Out, HAsTINGS CENTER STUDIES, May 1974, at 3.
138. See generally E. KUBLER-Ross, supra note 2; cf. Hagman, The Medical Patient's
Right to Know, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 758, 778-79 (1970).
139. See, e.g., Nation Moves Toward Right To Death, 2 CURRENT OPINIOq 39 (1974)
(in a Gallup Poll, 52 percent responded "yes" to the ,question, "When a person has a
disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed by law to end
the patient's life by some painless means if the patient and family request it?");
Hose. WEEK, Apr. 27. 1973 (in a Louis Harris poll, 62 percent of those interviewed
felt that they should be able to ask their doctor to let them die).
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to inform the patient of his condition in the first place, the issue of
competency has often been used by the medical profession to make its
own decisions as to what treatment to give terminal patients. 140 Thus,
courts should carefully consider the competency test. Therapeutic
privilege should not expand into a presumption of incompetency,
with the result of denying to the patient the right to render an in-
formed consent or to make his own decision about euthanasia.
IV. Needed Legislative Changes
Uncertainty regarding the law of suicide and homicide has prompted
many to feel that legislation authorizing some forms of euthanasia
is desirable. 141 Legislation would reduce fears of liability142 for ccm-
plicity in certain forms of voluntary euthanasia by health care pro-
viders and thus allow them to honor their patients' wishes.
Originally suicide 143 was a felony punishable by driving a stake
through the body and burying the corpse under a public highway.
All of the suicide's property was forfeited to the sovereign. 144 A mel-
lowing 45 of legal attitudes toward suicide has occurred so that it is
140. There is evidence that the medical profession does engage in passive euthanasia.
See Hearings on Dying, supra note 5, at 34-35 (a doctor testified that he had let hundreds
of patients die and that such was the practice of roughly "75 percent of the doctors").
See also Hearings on Dying, supra, at 25; J. KATz, supra note 131, at 692-709 (1972)
(collects several articles on the subject); NEwSWEEK, Jan. 28, 1974, at 43 (a 1969 poll
of the Ass'n of Am. Physicians found that 87 percent approved passive euthanasia, and
80 percent admitted having practiced it). Williams desires legislation to recognize this de
facto power in the discretion of health care providers. Williams, supra note 99, at 14,
15, 17.
141. See Hearings on Dying, supra note 5, at 33 (example of bill proposed in Florida
permitting passive euthanasia).
142. See Kamisar, supra note 93, at 982-83 n.41. See, e.g., Application of President
& Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 118 U.S. App. D.C. 80, 89 n.18, 331 F.2d 1000,
1009 n.18, rehearing denied, 118 U.S. App. D.C. 90, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377
U.S. 978 (1964) ("[d]eath resulting from failure to extend proper medical care, where
there is a duty of care, is manslaughter in the District of Columbia"); People v.
Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920) (conviction of murder for making avail-
able upon request the poison which dying wife drank); John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 581-82, 279 A.2d 670, 672-73 (1971) (attempted suicide
is a crime in New Jersey). See also Epstein & Benson, The Patient's Right to Refuse,
HosPITAI.s, Aug. 16, 1973, at 41 (safest course of conduct is to turn to courts for
guidance in each case of refusal of treatment); Hearings on Dying, supra note 5, at
68-70 (attempts to distinguish "benemortasia"), 80.
143. See generally Comment, The Punishment of Suicide-A Need for Change, 14
VILL. L. REv. 463 (1969).
144. State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 850, 251 N.W. 717, 718 (1933); Burnett v.
People, 204 Il. 208, 221, 68 N.E. 505, 510 (1903). In 1824, the English rule mellowed
so that the suicide's body could be buried in a churchyard, but only between 9:00
and 12:00 p.m. and without religious ceremonies. State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 475,
121 S.E.2d 854, 855 (1961).
145. Cf. Hearings on Dying, supra note 5, at 5; Boeth, Now, a Right to Suicide?,
NEwswE.K, Oct. 29, 1973, at 78, 83.
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no longer a crime in some jurisdictions; 14 however, in a few others,
suicide remains a felony or misdemeanor. 147 Some have argued that it
is proper to forbid suicide because every life has value to society and
may not be taken even by self-destruction. 4 This argument suggests
that the cost of the suicide of an individual is too great in terms of
lost productive potential and psychological damage to other persons
in society. However strong the argument with respect to suicide in
general, it merits close scrutiny in the voluntary euthanasia situation.
Three basic scenarios are presented. First, there is the case of the
dying patient refusing treatment but for whom no treatment could
effect a recovery. This patient has little in terms of productive poten-
tial to offer society. Though third parties might suffer disutility140
from a decision to refuse treatment, this psychological loss is pre-
sumably minimal since the patient is competent, voluntarily making
the decision, and would die relatively soon anyway. Further, commit-
ment to self-determination and privacy presupposes a disposition to
permit activities whose adverse impact on others is only psycholog-
ical. 50 Since the opportunity to refuse treatment may be very im-
portant to many patients, 15 deprivation of this choice may be a con-
siderable cost that is not outweighed by the adverse psychological im-
pact on others.
Second is the case of a dying patient who could recover but refuses
treatment. The primary example is that of an individual who refuses
on religious grounds. This patient presumably does have productive
potential for society. However, this society, generally committed to a
free market economy, normally refrains from compelling individuals
to maximize their productive potential; indeed, there are instances
146. See, e.g., Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907, 909 (WV.D.N.Y.
1947) (suicide not a crime but is a great public wrong; case applied § 2301 of N.Y.
PENAL LAW OF 1909 which was repealed by N.Y. PENAL LAW § 500.05 (McKinney 1967));
Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 903, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 33 (1960) (suicide not a
crime in California); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. State Police, 11 Mich. App. 351,
359, 158 N.W.2d 72, 76 (1968) (suicide neither a statutory nor common law crime in
Michigan); Hundert v. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Accident Ass'n of Am., 244 App.
Div. 459, 460, 279 N.Y.S. 555, 556 (1935).
147. See, e.g., State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 476, 121 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1961) (suicide
is a crime, probably a misdemeanor); State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120, 131, 13 S.E. 319, 321
(1891) (case interprets what is now S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-122 (1962) as retaining the
common law character of felony for suicide).
148. See, e.g., Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 52, 165 N.W.2d 377, 382, appeal
dismissed, 395 U.S. 709 (1969) ("protection of the safety of all . . . against the con-
sequences of their own actions is a legitimate use of the police powers of the state").
149. The disutility takes the form of psychological insecurity if the refusal of
treatment is perceived as derogatory of life. The insecurity may be a manifestation
of the denial of death, see p. 1647 supra.
150. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973). See also notes 86-88 supra.
The textual statement does not imply any established rule or principle uniformly applied.
151. See notes 124 & 139 supra.
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where it encourages considerable waste of productive potential.15 2
Thus, an individual decision to cease productive contribution to
society does not support abridging a patient's right to refuse treat-
ment. Any psychological harm to others must be balanced against
commitments to religious freedom,5 3 as well as interests in privacy
and self-determination.' 4 Again, deprivation of patients' choices may
be at such considerable cost as to overcome adverse psychological
impact on others.
Finally, there is the problem of the dying patient who requests
active rendition of a death-inducing agent. The opportunity to obtain
active euthanasia increases the choices available to a competent patient
and may reduce his costs by allowing him to select such a procedure
if it maximizes his satisfaction. Certainly active rendition could elim-
inate considerable suffering during a prolonged and irreversible dying
process. The suffering may impose substantial costs not only on the
patient but on his family and health care providers as well. However,
active euthanasia generally involves the participation of an identifiable
third party in its provision. Such participation may be at considerable
psychological cost to the third party and to society. Hence, as long
as a third party is heavily involved, the argument is stronger for so-
ciety to forbid voluntary active euthanasia.155
A strong argument often advanced for prohibiting suicide is that
decisions for self-destruction are not firmly held and may be only
pleas for help.150 However, there is evidence that many people who
152. See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 31-37, 58-60, 234-38
(1973) ("crypto-servant" role of women).
153. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972).
154. Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
155. Third party involvement and consequent psychological costs have been minimized
in some plans for rendition of active euthanasia. It has been suggested that third
parties be permitted to place poison beside a dying patient on request of the patient.
The patient would administer the poison to himself. "Switzerland permits the doctor
to put poison in the hand of the patient but not actually to administer it himself."
Rudikoff, supra note 135, at 62. Apparently a similar situation existed in Texas until
January 1, 1974. See note 165 infra. This position decreases involvement of third
parties, for the final act is performed solely by the patient. Indeed, the third party
involvement seems akin to "unplugging" a life support apparatus which had been sus-
taining the patient.
Of course, the political feasibility of even voluntary passive euthanasia legislation
is questionable. Oregon State Senator Hoyt, a sponsor of House Bill 2997 (legalizing
passive euthanasia) in the 1973 session of the Oregon legislature, has concluded that
euthanasia legislation is not politically possible: "Legislation has to follow public
opinion, it cannot lead it ...... He has decided "reluctantly to take the subject out
of the political arena and depend on social education." Letter from State Senator
C.R. Hoyt to Charles H. Montange, Mar. 20, 1974 (copy on file with the Yale Law Journal).
Senator Hoyt also notes that espousal of euthanasia "is a definite political liability."
156. This may indeed be true of certain classes of individuals. Patel, Pathology of
Suicide, 13 MED., Sci. & L. 103, 104 (1973).
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take their own lives do so with determination and conviction.157 This
observation logically applies with special force to dying patients seek-
ing a form of euthanasia, and consequently the sanction against
suicide is less defensible when applied to this group.'68 Thus, policies
prohibiting suicide might be limited to apply only to nonterminal
cases. Alternatively, definitions could be changed to make clear that
voluntary passive euthanasia is not suicide.
The issue of liability for euthanasia has seldom reached the courts.DD
Perhaps this is due to prosecutorial discretion,160 but it is more likely
due to difficulty of proof,"' or simply to failure of authorities to dis-
cover the situation. 62 Nonetheless, dictum in some jurisdictions indi-
cates that complicity in active euthanasia even by a well-intentioned
physician would constitute sufficient malice for a murder prosecu-
tion.' 63 In others, statutes indicate that assistance in euthanasia
amounts to the crime of aiding and abetting suicide. 64 In still others,
in the absence of a specific statute regarding aiding suicide, such
assistance may be murder, manslaughter, or no violation of the law. 00
Passive euthanasia provides a more difficult problem; commentators
157. Id. at 104-05. The study found that suicides in elderly age groups were neither
insane nor mentally abnormal; rather they made determined attempts due to the loss
of a loved one or because of physical or social calamity.
158. There is authority suggesting the anti-suicide sanctions should apply to indi-
viduals seeking euthanasia for religious purposes. See Application of President & Directors
of Georgetown College, Inc., 118 U.S. App. D.C. 80, 89 n.18, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 n.18,
rehearing denied, 118 U.S. App. D.C. 90, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964) (Jehovah's Witness given blood transfusions to save her life over objections by
herself and her family).
159. American and British law apparently record only two prosecutions of physicians
for murdering dying patients. Euthanasia Questions Stir New Debate, supra note 3, at 73.
160. Kamisar, supra note 93, at 971.
161. See Williams, supra note 93, at 15 (morphine is an easily disguised death-
inducing agent). See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1974, at 66, col. 2 (morphine sulfate could
reduce one "to a terminal status very rapidly").
162. See Parry-Jones, supra note 99.
163. People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 322, 411 P.2d 911, 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815,
822 (1966) (rraynor, J., dictum: "[OJ ne who commits euthanasia bears no ill will toward
his victim and believes his act is morally justified, but he nonetheless acts with malice
if he is able to comprehend that society prohibits his act regardless of his personal belief").
164. See, e.g., English Suicide Act of 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 60 (suicide no longer
a crime but aiding and abetting it is); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.30 (promoting suicide
attempt is a felony), 125.15 (manslaughter) (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 2505(b) (1973).
165. Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 343 Mass. 19, 175 N.E.2d 387 (1961) (manslaughter);
People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920) (murder). The Texas position
prior to January 1, 1974, was that since suicide was not criminal in the state, "one
who has aided or abetted suicide is innocent of any violation of law." 53 TEXAS JURIS-
PRUDENCE 528-29 (2d ed. 1964). Aiding or attempting to aid suicide in Texas is now
a statutory crime. TEx. PENAL CODE art. 22.08 (Vernon's 1974). Texas was possibly the
only state which viewed aiding suicide as noncriminal absent a statute. Comment,
supra note 142, at 474. However, in the absence of a statute, other states are pre.
sumably not precluded from adopting the old Texas common law view.
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disagree as to whether the law will attach criminal liability. 66 But
since the line between passive and active euthanasia is somewhat arbi-
trary,1 7 many cases of passive euthanasia are under the cloud of po-
tential criminal or civil liability.168 One would expect rational deci-
sionmaking and more deference to the wishes of patients if the risk
of liability were removed.
There remain two final objections which should be faced. It is
asserted 1 9 that if voluntary euthanasia is now permitted, soon invol-
untary euthanasia of perceived misfits will be legalized and common.
However, this argument does not recognize the gulf that separates
voluntary euthanasia and involuntary euthanasia, 70 a gulf defined
by the doctrine of informed consent. Limiting legal euthanasia to
cases involving terminal patients who give an informed consent to the
procedure supplies a line of sufficient clarity to prevent the imposi-
tion of mercy killing on nonconsenting terminal patients.
The second and more pragmatic objection is that even if the prin-
ciple of euthanasia were accepted, specific plans for euthanasia are
unworkable: 1 7 ' The plans either restrict the availability of their pro-
visions or unduly bureaucratize the sick room in order to provide the
necessary safeguards. Certain plans undoubtedly have this effect, since
they require long waiting periods between request for euthanasia and
its rendition, 72 or introduce a new agent into the hospital to repre-
sent the dying patient to his family, doctor, and associates.1 73 An al-
ternative approach is the "living will," a document executed by the
patient while healthy which purports to specify when treatment may
be terminated when the individual becomes critically ill.174 Unfortu-
166. Compare Cantor, supra note 5, at 258-64, with Kamisar, supra note 93, at 982
n.41. See also Hearings on Dying, supra note 5, at 68-70, 89; cf. Fletcher, supra note 99,
at 1008 (withdrawal of treatment analyzed as omission so as not to import liability for
homicide).
167. See Cantor, supra note 5, at 261. See also Williams, supra note 99, at 21 (act
versus omission).
168. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 15 (case report of a euthanasia resulting in civil
action for wrongful death).
169. See Kamisar, supra note 93, at 1014. See also M. MANNES, LAST RIGHTS 101-05
(1974); Kutner, supra note 5, at 545-46.
170. See Cantor, supra note 5, at 261.
171. See Kamisar, supra note 93, at 978.
172. See Morris, supra note 5, at 266-71.
173. See Sullivan, supra note 90, at 212. See also Note, supra note 16, at 689.
174. See Kutner, supra note 5. A copy of a model living will prepared by the
Euthanasia Education Council is reprinted in Hearings on Dying, supra note 5, at 141.
The Connecticut State Medical Society has prepared a living will which was rejected
by the AMA. See Report 8 of the AMA Judicial Council at the AMA Clinical Conv.
in Anaheim, Cal., Dec. 2-5, 1973. E. Howard, Actions Taken by the AMA House of
Delegates, Dec. 17, 1973, at 31. The Connecticut document is reprinted in Ramsey,
The Indignity of 'Death with Dignity,' HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES, May 1974, at 47, 52.
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nately, most living wills are so vague that they offer little confidence
in the adequacy of safeguards for euthanasia under their aegis.'" The
scheme which this Note suggests does not involve great complexity or
bureaucratization. The terminal patient, like the nonterminal patient,
is entitled to refuse treatment. 7 6
Conclusion
The individual's right to self-determination over his own body is
frequently asserted as the axiomatic foundation of informed consent.
Recent informed consent cases abolishing the medical community
standard rule for disclosure have returned to a position of greater
consistency with the Schloendorff axiom. It is fundamental to the doc-
trine that a right to consent presupposes a right to refuse. Hence, if
courts take informed consent seriously, they must recognize the right
of a competent terminal patient to forego treatment.
Countervailing concerns about the psychological impact of refusals
of treatment upon society are not strong enough to overcome the law's
commitment to decisionmaking by the individual with respect to his
own medical treatment. Society's interests in minimizing incorrect
decisions may be met by proper tests for competency and by measures
to assure sufficient comprehension of relevant material information.
The outcome remains the same: recognition of the patient's right to
refuse, whether the patient is terminal or not.' 7 Through application
of developing tort doctrine, the courts alone might achieve this result.
However, legislation which dispels the fear of possible criminal lia-
bility in cases of voluntary euthanasia is desirable. Lawmakers should
mitigate the uncertainties and generate adequate legal measures to
permit a dignified death.
175. Living wills might be individually tailored to mitigate some of the uncertainties
as to actual intent under particular circumstances, and also to display thorough com-
prehension of the document signed. See Modell, A "Will" to Live, 290 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 907, 908 (1974).
176. See, e.g., Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
177. This outcome is apparently consistent with the desires of the majority of
Americans. See notes 124 & 139 supra.
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